Abstract: Aim of the present work is to offer an understanding of the mechanisms informing the making and reproduction of the Hittite Empire (17th-13th BCE) in its diachronic evolution. The analysis focuses on South-Central Anatolia, an area of intense core-periphery interactions within the scope of the Hittite domain and, therefore, of great informative potential about the manifold trajectories of imperial action. Through the combinatory investigation of archaeological and textual data able to account for long-to short-term variables of social change, I will show that South-Central Anatolia evolved from being a loose agglomerate of city-hinterland nuclei into a provincial system. The region thus acquired a pivotal role in the balance of power thanks to its centrality in the communication network, and it became the stage for eventful political revolutions, as well as a new core for Hittite political dynamics. The picture of Hittite imperialism emerging, thus, is that of a set of multi-causal and multi-directional processes, not predicated on the sole centrifugal hegemonic expansion of the empire.
Political geographies of the Hittite Empire
Hittite history spans the entire Late Bronze Age in Anatolia, covering approximately four and a half centuries (ca. 1650 (ca. -1200 . At the beginning of this period, the Hittite state emerged in North-Central Anatolia, in the bend of the Kızıl Irmak, from a mosaic of canton polities occupying the area during the Middle Bronze Age. A first phase of Hittite history, termed the Old Kingdom (seventeenth-sixteenth century BCE), saw the Hittite rulers gaining supremacy in Anatolia, gradually and with alternating success. In the following phase, termed the Empire period (fifteenth-thirteenth century BCE), the Hittites acquired considerable geopolitical prestige by expanding their hegemony over much of Western Anatolia, the Northern Levant and parts of Upper Mesopotamia, while entertaining contacts on equal terms with great powers of the Eastern Mediterranean, such as Egypt, Assyria and the Mycenaean world ( Figure 1 ).
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Figure 1: The Hittite world, with highlight of the present study area. Graphics by Alvise Matessi.
1 A brief note on chronology is here in order: due to the lack of a chronological system of its own in Hittite record keeping, major problems still exist in fitting the Hittite royal sequence to an absolute dating framework. Moreover, floating chronologies for the 2nd millennium BCE in Mesopotamian or Egyptian contexts also hinder attested synchronisms. Generally speaking, the Hittite evidence seems to favor the so-called 'middle chronology', according to which the sack of Babylon by Mursili I dates to 1595 BCE (see now Schachner 2011: 11-12) . Be that as it may, starting at least from the mid-fourteenth century (reign of Suppiluliuma I) we can rely upon a comparatively firmer chronological ground. For an up-to-date overview on Hittite chronology and related issues, see Genz and Mielke 2011: 14-19 . For more detailed treatments, see Beckman 2000; Wilhelm 2004; Dinçol 2006 . For an overview on the Eastern Mediterranean, see now Manning et al. 2016 , favoring the 'middle chronology '. As in much of the historical work on the Hittites, research on the spatial outcomes of Hittite imperial policies has chiefly relied upon information deriving from the myriad cuneiform tablets found at the Hittite capital-Hattusa/ Boğazköy-and at other important findspots in Anatolia and Syria. In particular, studies on the Hittite political geography have evidenced that, by the mid-fourteenth century BCE, the Hittite Empire was structured in different tiers of integration fitting into a sort of "territorial-hegemonic continuum".
2 On the one end of the continuum there was Hatti, the Hittite core region located in North-Central Anatolia, which was directly dependent on the Hittite central authority. The opposite end, instead, included a series of client states in Syria and Western Anatolia, governed by subordinate rulers, called 'kings' or even 'small kings,' as opposed to the Hittite Great Kings residing in Hattusa. Several situations floated in between these two poles, with specific formulations depending on the means by which polities were integrated into the Hittite domain (Altman 2003) . Examples of such intermediate tiers are the appanage states of Karkemiš, in northern Syria, and, as we shall see, Tarhuntassa, in South-Central Anatolia. These were vice-regal kingdoms governed by direct offspring of the Hittite royal family, who enjoyed a special position in the Hittite state hierarchy, often playing as intermediaries between the Great Kings and subordinate client rulers. Recent archaeological research has provided ground for a bottom-up approach to the socio-spatial layout of the Hittite domain able to complement or refine text-based perspectives (Glatz 2009; Schachner 2009; Manuelli 2013: 355-423) . In particular, Glatz's article proposes a synthesis explicitly challenging text-based reconstructions of the Hittite geography of power grounding upon a selection of four archaeological categories, taken as proxies for different spheres of interaction between core and periphery: settlement trends; 'Hittite' or, in Glatz's own terms, "North-Central Anatolian-style" (NCA-style) pottery; administrative tools-chiefly "NCA-style" glyptic; and landscape monuments. This selection is based on the assumption that each category reflects a particular network of spatial interactions relevant to the construction of imperial relationships. For instance, "landscape monuments are projections 2 For full theorizations of the concept of "territorial-hegemonic continuum" as a strategy of rule employing varying scales of local sovereignty, from intense to loose, see especially Luttwak 1976; and D'Altroy 1992: 18-24 . For a synthesis on the structure of Hittite imperial administration see Beckman 1995a; Mora 2003a (in the general context of the Ancient Near East during the 2nd millennium BCE). More case specific investigations are, among the others, Altman 2003; d 'Alfonso 2005; Beckman 1995b .
The Making of Hittite Imperial Landscapes of centralized power and claims over territories" while settlement dynamics "allow us to detect changes in the socio-political organization" (Glatz 2009: 136 and 129) . 3 Glatz reconstructs a pattern of overlapping spheres of spatial control, ranging from intensive territorial integration to hegemonic and ephemeral control. The spatial model resulting from Glatz's analysis refines our resolution on the Hittite geography of power, emphasizing multiple dimensions otherwise escaping an uncritical reading of extant textual sources. However, both the philologically and the archaeologically informed perspectives on the Hittite political geography devote only a limited attention to the actual spatial workings of Hittite imperialism.
4 Following current definitions (Doyle 1986: 45; Sinopoli 1994: 160) , imperialism is the set of mechanisms informing the making and reproduction of empires. A focus on Hittite imperialism, therefore, would require a diachronic rather than structural approach to the spatiality of the Hittite Empire. Text-based reconstructions of the Hittite political geography mostly reflect the cumulative spatial result of imperial action as seen through the lens of fourteenth and thirteenth century BCE sources that admittedly represent the bulk of the extant Hittite written legacy. The outcome, therefore, is a palimpsest picture that overshadows formative and transformative processes. Also Glatz's archaeological synthesis has a limit in the same static outcome, as it suffers from the lack of temporal depth. This is determined, indeed, by the very archaeological proxies informing Glatz's work. In particular, the diachronic evolution of Late Bronze Age ceramic assemblages has been thoroughly investigated only in a few sites, which makes pottery an inadequate tool for a clear-cut definition of cultural phases within the period of Hittite rule in Anatolia (Schoop 2006; Manuelli 2013) . This problem imposes a burden especially on the analysis of cross-regional settlement trends, for which relevant data mostly derive from archaeological surveys that is, in large part, from unstratified pottery collections. As to the Hittite monuments, iconographic details and, in several cases, inscriptions in the so-called Anatolian Hieroglyphic enable us to establish better connections between the formation of given archaeological landscapes and short-term political developments. However, all known artifacts of this kind were produced during quite a limited time-span (late fourteenth-thirteenth century BCE : Ehringhaus 2005) , when the Hittite Empire was already at its apogee or even declining. Finally, when it comes to Anatolian glyptic traditions, the limited number and the scattered spatial and chronological distribution of related finds do not provide solid ground for an association with long-and short-term processes of imperial construction (Mora 1987; Herbordt 2006) . In sum, while current understandings of the Hittite political geography, when adequately crosschecked with one another, produce a valid palimpsest of the spatial structure of the Hittite empire they account very little for formative and transformative processes. Even when the spatial outcomes of Hittite imperial policies are analyzed in a diachronic overview there is a tendency to interpret textual sources from a Hatticentric perspective.
5 This induces to an understanding of the Hittite territorial expansion that telescopes centrifugal processes to the detriment of dialectic interactions. Similarly, Glatz's work, as well as other strands of archaeological research of the past decades (e. g. Gorny 1995; Schachner 2011), mostly concentrates on local receptions across the Hittite domain of movements originated in the Hittite heartland. However, imperialism may be conceptualized as a largescale process whose motor does not reside only in an expansive core, but also in the peripheries that directly or indirectly contribute to significant transformations within the core itself. 6 Even though stances of cultural resistance and continuity at the margins of the Empire are being more and more emphasized (e. g. MacSweeney 2010; Manuelli 2013), few attempts have been made so far in order to understand how different trajectories of socio-cultural interaction have contributed to shape the Hittite imperial landscape.
In the attempt to cope with these theoretical premises, this paper aims to offer a view on dynamic processes informing the making and reproduction of the Hittite Empire and on the manifold variables that were involved. A focus on South-Central Anatolia grants considerable advantage to this approach for two reasons. Firstly, relationships between the Hittite central authorities and the geopolitical entities of South-Central Anatolia are quite well documented in extant written sources throughout the period of Hittite rule. Secondly, as I will emphasize, South-Central Anatolia occupied a geographic position halfway between the core and the south and west peripheries of the Hittite Empire, and, consequently, its socio-spatial networks were heavily impacted by the multiple trajectories of imperialism. The patterns of social interaction that can be inferred from the combination of these two factors may become an intriguing subject of investigation from both a spatial and diachronic perspective. Anthropological and archaeological critique of the past decades provides important conceptual tools for such a spatially and temporally dynamic approach, promoting, from different angles, the combinatory investigation of multiple datasets, able to account for variables operating at different time scales (e. g. Bintliff 1991; B. Parker 2001; Smith 2003; VanValkenbourg and Osborne 2012) . In this purview, this article will draw conclusions based on both the discussion of regional data on the Late Bronze Age archaeological landscapes of South-Central Anatolia and the interpretation of geopolitical information derived from relevant written sources. While archaeological datasets are especially useful for a view on long-and mid-term variables of sociocultural interaction, I will rely upon textual data in order to obtain the chronological resolution necessary to examine short-term processes of geopolitical change.
South-Central Anatolia: geographic definition
The geographic extension of South-Central Anatolia in this paper is defined, clockwise from the north, by the Salt Lake, the volcanic group Hasan-Melendiz, the Central Taurus, the Mediterranean Sea and the Eğridir lake. Far from being homogeneous, this area, rather, is composed by a variety of landscapes, which heavily impacted the development of human settlement through time.
An inner continental area is represented by the Konya plain, a marl plateau (ca. 1000 masl) extending for ca. 10,000 km 2 . Its main hydrological feature is the Çarşamba river, which springs from the Şugla lake basin and spreads into an endorheic delta to the east of Konya. A karst basin originating from the Taurus mountains flows northward beneath the plateau to feed the Salt Lake, a shallow hypersaline water body extending for no less than 3000 km 2 . Low precipitation rates (ca. 300 ml per year) prevent rain fed agriculture from flourishing in the Konya plain, so that, before the introduction of mechanical water pumping systems, local populations mostly depended on dry-farming and the herding of sheep, goat and cattle in the steppe pasturelands. Large areas of this kind, such as the Obruk Yaylası, extending south of the Salt Lake, are almost completely lacking in settlements. On the contrary, irrigated farming, supported by modern canalization works, sustains a denser population in the Çarşamba floodplain.
The Karadağ, the Karacadağ and the Hasan-Melendiz complex form a paleovolcanic region rising at the eastern fringes of the Konya plain. These marked outcrops today host a poor vegetation but are patched by modest woods as well as by orchards of local villagers in proximity to watercourses. Moreover, water flowing close to the surface at the mountain feet also allows cultivation, before drying up or sinking into the ground towards the centre of the plain. Fertile stretches of land are also found in the western appendices of the Konya basin, at the feet of the Sultan and Emir mountains and in the so-called Lake District, around the Beyşehir and Eğridir lakes.
South of the Hasan-Melendiz volcanic massif lies the Bor-Ereğli plain, an arid steppe surrounded by significant patches of lush vegetation in connection with alluvial deposits at the mountain feet. During the Holocene, due to climatic fluctuations, the Bor-Ereğli plain experienced a process of soil salinization alternating with the formation of small lakes and marshes. 7 In particular, during the Late Bronze Age, a former lake extending in the plain, west of Bor, evolved into a marsh, with further salinization of the soil (Gürel and Lermi 2010; d'Alfonso 2010) . Topography makes the Konya plain a formidable catchment of natural corridors, which contributed to growing cultural interactions since the later prehistory (Efe 2007) . To the north, a major north-south axis leads to North-Central Anatolia through the Konaklı corridor, with an opening between the Melendiz and the Taurus mountains. The Sultan Dağ range, to the northwest, forms the ridge between two east-west corridors. The first, in Roman times hosting the via Sebaste, 8 runs parallel to the Taurus across the Lake District. The other corridor, now followed by the highway KonyaAfyonkarahisar, runs through the Akarçay valley between the Sultan Dağ and the Emir Dağ. The Konya plain is fenced in to the south by the impervious mountain ranges of the Taurus. One of the main sub-groups of the Taurus chain is the Bolkar Dağ that rises up to 3500 masl at the southern edge of the Bor-Ereğli plain, thus forming a steep and almost impenetrable barrier. The only viable passage across the Bolkar Dağ was provided in the Roman period by the via Tauri, passing through the narrow gorge of the Cilician Gates. However, already during the prehistory and throughout the Bronze Age, the Cilician Gates functioned as an important link between the Anatolian plateau and the Eastern Mediterranean, as documented by archaeological and, when available, epigraphic evidence.
9 This ancient connection, today, is followed and heavily modified by the Aksaray-Adana route (D750), descending to Adana through the Gökoluk river valley. Westwards, in Rough Cilicia, the Taurus assumes a more rugged aspect. Here, a major topographical discontinuity is determined by the Göksu river, forming a broad valley along its central stream. Together with the Cilician Gates, the Göksu valley represents one of the few feasible passages through the Taurus towards the Mediterranean. It is nowadays accessed from the Konya plain through the Sertavul pass, between Karaman and Mut. 10 3 Archaeological data Political histories of early complex polities and empires, especially in the Ancient Near East, are increasingly making use of datasets deriving from archaeological surveys and excavations. In fact, while survey data provide compelling ground for understanding long-term patterns of socio-spatial integration on a regional scale, excavated sequences allow assessment with greater chronological resolution of the place-specific impact of socio-cultural transformations. In contrast to North-Central Anatolia, where research on a growing number of Hittite sites is continuing since the first excavations started at Hattusa/ Boğazköy more than one century ago, South-Central Anatolia has remained for a long time at the margins of Hittite archaeology. Still in 1986, the Konya plain and the central Taurus appeared as an almost empty space in the map of Hittite sites included in the Atlante Storico del Vicino Oriente (Forlanini and Marazzi 1986: Tav. I) . Nonetheless, archaeological research in South-Central Anatolia has much improved over the past decades, with the joint contribution of numerous regional survey projects and excavations at key sites (Figure 2 ).
Surveys
Pioneering extensive surveys by James Mellaart and David French in the 1950s and 1960s add up to entirely cover our study region, with the latter concentrated Before illustrating the combined results of these projects and their relevance to the present topic, a few notes must be reserved to the limits of their evidence. A first limit has general methodological implications, as it derives from the heterogeneity of the contributory projects plotted in the analysis, which may The Making of Hittite Imperial Landscapes have an outcome of inaccurate evaluations of settlement patterns. In fact, distributed over the past 60 years, the surveys carried out in South-Central Anatolia differ a lot from each other in terms of their objectives, site classification criteria and methodologies. They vary from extensive explorations mostly aimed at site reconnaissance for all periods (Figure 2: c, d and i) or a selection thereof (Figure 2 : a, b, l and m), to more intensive and specialized endeavors, engaged in interdisciplinary approaches with a view to targeting broad ranges of man-environment interactions (Figure 2 : e-g, and n-q).
11 In addition, the contributory projects considered do not cover the entirety of the focused area, and major "no data" gaps concern the Taurus uplands and some locales of the northern plateau (Figure 3 ).
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The second limit hinges upon the specific spatiotemporal coordinates of the present work. In Central Anatolia, the 2nd millennium BCE is characterized by an overall continuity in cultural traditions, evidenced especially in pottery assemblages. This continuity restricts the range of ceramic diagnostics for the different phases of the 2nd millennium BCE, calling for caution especially when analyzing diachronic settlement trends between the Middle and the Late Bronze Age. 13 Here, a synchronic analysis of survey results will be preferred, aiming to understand the degree of integration of South-Central Anatolia within the Hittite interregional system through the reconstruction of its communication network. Such an approach is only partially undermined by the above limits as long as it is attained by integrating bare settlement data with other evidence, which is substantially related to Late Bronze Age archaeological landscapes. The Hittite landscape monuments, for example, are very useful to the stated purpose, since they were usually erected in locales of major social interaction and friction, such as boundaries and, precisely, communication routes (Ehringhaus 2005; Glatz and Plourde 2011) . Finally, the picture 11 Also particular situations contingent to the timing of the projects must be taken into account. In particular, surveys carried out in 2013 or later are conditioned by a new law of the Turkish Ministry of Culture restricting the collecting and washing of surface finds. This could have affected appropriate assessments about the sites visited that are best attained after detailed measuring, photographing and drawing of finds in laboratory environments. For a more detailed description of the various projects and their characteristics, see Matessi and Tomassini Pieri 2017 . resulting from the distribution pattern of landscape monuments and settlements is complemented by information inferred from Hittite textual records. Therefore, Late Bronze Age route landscapes in South-Central Anatolia can be reconstructed or at least conjectured with a satisfying degree of approximation.
The sum of the contributory projects here taken into account provides for the identification of more than two hundred sites with likely traces of 2nd millennium BCE occupation, whereas 164 are more specifically ascribed to the Late Bronze Age (Figure 3 ). Highest settlement concentrations in this period seem to feature the northwestern half of the study area, with minor clusters in the environs of Konya, in the upper alluvium of the Çarşamba and in piedmont areas. In striking contrast with the high urbanization nowadays characterizing As stressed above, very little has been explored of the Taurus highlands and Rough Cilicia, but the few available data point to a very low settlement rate during the Late Bronze Age (Aksoy 1991; Rauh et al. 2009 ). Poor Late Bronze Age settlement also characterizes the arid steppes of the Obruk Yaylası, an area almost uninhabited in present days, too. Nonetheless, a few Late Bronze Age sites are found at the southern fringes of the Obruk Yaylası, in the stretch of relatively fertile land along the piedmont of the Karacadağ. Significantly, these settlements are aligned at a rather regular distance (18-22 km) between Emirgazi and Karapınar, following one of the main east-west orographic corridors across the Konya basin ( Figure 3 ). In this respect, it is worth noting that the eastern end of the alignment is located just close to the find-spot of the Emirgazi altars. Information about the exact original position of these artifacts is very meager. Nonetheless, they are intimately connected with the surrounding landscape. Running around the altars, in fact, is a lengthy hieroglyphic dedication by the Hittite king Tuthaliya IV (13th BCE) to the mountain god Sarpa, likely to be identified with mountain Arısama, a small outcrop facing the Karacadağ from behind Emirgazi. 15 It is reasonable that the presence of a major route of transit passing in the vicinity of the altars played a role in the choice for their collocation. Moreover, if we assume that habitation in the four sites forming the regular alignment at the Karacadağ feet overlapped in time during the Late Bronze Age, their evidence would combine with that of the altars and draw a north-east to south-west transit route. A least-cost pathway analysis (LCPA) performed with GRASS GIS on an ASTER Digital Elevation Model shows that the road through Emirgazi is likely to have passed by the site of Zengen Höyük to join a cluster of sites at the piedmont of the Hasan-Melendiz. 16 In turn, the Hasan-Melendiz piedmont was likely connected with the crucial north-south axes of the Konaklı valley and the Cilician Gates.
On the opposite side of the Konya province, between the Sultan and Emir mountain ranges, lies the Akşehir open-through. Major route connections passed across this area in antiquity and, more specifically, during the Hittite period, as hinted by the high density of Late Bronze Age settlement observable there. The strategic value of the Akşehir open-through during the Late Bronze Age is also suggested by the presence of a Hittite fortress, Ilgın Kaleköy/Zeferiye, built on a hilltop guarding the eastern entrance of the corridor.
17 About 7 km to the southeast of Ilgın Kaleköy lies the Hittite dam of Köylütolu ( Figure 3 ) that was possibly used as a mustering point for Hittite troops transiting in the area (Ullmann 2010: 217, n. 485) . Like the altars of Emirgazi, the Köylütolu dam was sponsored by Tuthaliya IV, to whom is associated an inscription featured on a basalt block recovered from within the earthen wall of the dam (Masson 1980) . Another, more outstanding monument of Tuthaliya IV lies not far from Köylütolu, in the hilltops overlooking the plain of Ilgın: it is the Yalburt spring pool, carved with a lengthy hieroglyphic inscription. In paragraph 4.2 I will further discuss this evidence in connection with the geopolitical scenario of South-Central Anatolia during the second half of the thirteenth century BCE. We lack archaeological information for the 2nd millennium BCE occupation in the middle course of the via Tauri toward the Cilician Gates, but available settlement data at the northern feet of the Taurus suggest that the Late Bronze Age route diverged here in two branches: one running westward to Ereğli (Hittite Hupisna?) and the other running north-eastward to Tyana/Tuwanuwa and Niğde 16 LCPA is a distance analysis tool within GIS applications that calculates the most costeffective route between a source and a destination through a cost surface generated on the basis of criteria determined by the user. For calculating the cost surface, I used the r.walk function on GRASS GIS, that takes into account slope and direction of movement. Generally speaking, LCPA does not constitute evidence per se, since other important factors for determining routes, such as cultural barriers or access to water resources, cannot be easily integrated in the analysis when related to an ancient landscape. In the present case, however, the results of the LCPA are supported by fortunate circumstantial elements: in the vicinity of Zengen Höyük also the base for an Iron Age or even possibly Late Bronze Age stele was found, as well as a spring. These elements considerably corroborate the hypothesis of a major route of transit passing close to the site. These data were presented in detail by Çiğdem Maner and myself at the 10th ICAANE (Vienna, April 25th-29th 2016) and will be published in a forthcoming paper. 17 A dating of the fortress to the Hittite period has been convincingly proposed on account of surfacing architecture and finds (Dinçol et al.2000: 21, Figure 4; Harmanşah and Johnson 2012: 77-78) .
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( Figures 3 and 4) . The existence of such itineraries would fit with information inferred from Hittite written sources (Forlanini 2013: 16-20) .
Much evidence suggests that also the Göksu river valley worked as a vital communication route during the Late Bronze Age. Firstly, it led directly to the Hittite harbor of Ura, likely located at the mouth of the Göksu in the vicinity of Silifke.
18 As we will see in better detail (paragraph 4.2), various textual sources from the Empire period describe Ura as a main intermediary in the commercial relationships between Hatti and the Levant (Klengel 1974; . From an archaeological viewpoint, strong ties between the Göksu valley and NorthCentral Anatolia during the Late Bronze Age are hinted by the fact that the two areas display very similar distribution patterns of imported ceramics (Kozal 2003; . In particular, the Red Lustrous Wheel-made ware, diffused throughout Anatolia from the fifteenth century BCE and likely originating from Cyprus (lastly, Grave et al. 2014) , is found in large quantities in the Göksu valley at Kilise Tepe (see below) and in North-Central Anatolian sites, namely at Hattusa/ Boğazköy itself, but is comparatively much scarcer in other important areas of the Hittite domain in Anatolia, such as plain Cilicia. Since no 2nd millennium site is known in the Göksu valley upstream from Mut, we may assume that during this period access to the valley from the Konya plain was provided by the Sertavul pass. This hypothesis is strengthened by the presence of a 2nd millennium site, Kozlubucak, just close to the northern end of the Sertavul pass. During the Late Bronze Age, Kozlubucak possibly also had a role in the inner Anatolian circulation of the Red Lustrous Wheel-made ware that, in fact, has been collected in remarkable quantities on the surface of the site.
19 Through Kozlubucak, the path coming from the Göksu valley crossed the environs of Karaman before proceeding into the Konya plain.
Excavations
When compared to the large amount of possible Late Bronze Age sites individuated through regional surveys, there are only a few sites in our study region providing substantial stratified data for the same period, namely Kilise Tepe, Porsuk/Zeyve Höyük and Kınık Höyük ( Figure 2 ). 21 The stratigraphic articulation between these two levels is particularly clear on the eastern side of the mound (Chantier IV), while the western edge (Chantier II) is occupied by a monumental Late Bronze Age defensive system probably in use during both Niveaux 6 and 5. In both areas, the last Late Bronze Age occupation is sealed by destruction layers of carbonized or charred debris, likely deriving from a major fire event. While the finds from Niveau 6 are still waiting for full publication, the ceramic assemblages of Niveau 5 would safely ascribe its material culture to a North-Central Anatolian cultural horizon (Dupré 1983; Glatz 2009: 129-131) . As to the chronology of the Late Bronze Age sequence at Porsuk, combined dendrochronological and radiocarbon data would date the construction of Niveau 6 to the second half of the seventeenth century and that of Niveau 5 to the early sixteenth century BCE. 22 More problematic is dating the end of the Late Bronze Age occupation and its relation to subsequent Iron Age phases (Niveaux 4-3), whose initial chronology is also not well established. Former hypotheses were purely speculative and associated the destruction of Niveau 5 with the collapse of the Hittite Empire in the late thirteenth century (Dupré 1983: 42) . Seeking a firmer chronological ground by disentangling the archaeological evidence from any historical prejudice, the Porsuk team undertook a new program for obtaining absolute dates from several areas and levels of the site. While some of these analyses still wait for full processing and publication, none of the dates so far obtained and reported point to the existence of a thirteenth century occupation at Porsuk (Beyer et al., "Zeyve Höyük -Porsuk 2011 and Beyer 2015) . On the contrary, they induce scholars to reconsider previous speculative reconstructions and to situate the final destruction of the Late Bronze Age settlement at Porsuk at some point between the late fifteenth and the mid-fourteenth century BCE rather than in the late thirteenth century BCE. 
The archaeological landscape of South-Central Anatolia: conclusions
From the analysis of archaeological data presented here, we infer that the study region played a prominent role in the Late Bronze Age communication network in Anatolia, representing a complex node between east-west routes-especially relevant for military purposes-and north-south routes, leading to the Eastern Mediterranean through the Taurus passes. Moreover, the chronologically refined information deriving from a few excavated sites evidences multiple episodes of reformulation of built environments during the Late Bronze Age. These differ from each other in quality, ranging from destructions to (re)building activities, but they equally affected public constructions or large portions of settlements, thus acquiring particular significance in a socio-political perspective. Moreover, while most shifts are non synchronic, a possible convergence is to be found significantly between the fifteenth and fourteenth centuries BCE (Table 1 ). In the next paragraphs, I will frame this information within the narrative of the transformations affecting the political geography of South-Central Anatolia under the Hittite hegemony.
4 Historical interpretation 4.1 South-Central Anatolia and the formation of the Lower Land (seventeenth-fifteenth century BCE)
During the fourteenth century BCE the most relevant political entity of SouthCentral Anatolia as known from Hittite texts was the Lower Land. 25 There is no certainty about its precise extent, but we are now sure that it comprised large portions of the Konya plain and the piedmont of the central Taurus range. The Hittite words used for defining the Lower Land are not known, since the conventional English translation depends from a heterographic form, KUR ŠAPLĪTI, with which the region is indicated wherever it is attested in extant sources (log. KUR = "country, land"; Akk. šaplītu = "the lower part"). 26 Direct references to the Lower Land/KUR ŠAPLĪTI are scattered in about fifteen texts that, significantly, are all dated to the fourteenth and thirteenth centuries, i. e. to the 1999: 188) . The interpretation of the Lower Land as a province would be supported by an analogy with another region of the Hittite domain, the Upper Land. As the name suggests, the Upper Land was the geographic counterpart of the Lower Land and was located on the upper course of the Kızıl Irmak in NorthEast Anatolia (Gurney 2003) . Also, the Upper Land was indicated through heterographic expressions of the type KUR ELĪTI, mirroring KUR ŠAPLĪTI (log. KUR = "country, land"; Akk. elītu = "the upper part"). 27 The parallel between the two lands is quite compelling: since, under the reign of Mursili II, the Upper Land was certainly a coherent province administered by local governors on behalf of the king, as proven by the "Apology" of Hattusili III (CTH 81 -Otten 1981; van den Hout 2003) , it stands to reason that the same was also true for the Lower Land. The writing of the place names Lower and Upper Land offers additional clues about the political statuses of the denoted regions. In fact, as Yakubovich argues (2014: 349) , if KUR ŠAPLĪTI and KUR ELĪTI did reflect popular names used in the current language, the corresponding syllabic writing would also be expected to appear as alternatives to the heterographic forms, known and employed only within the restricted scribal circles of the Hittite court. Instead, the fact that only heterographic forms are attested suggests that the place names KUR ŠAPLĪTI and KUR ELĪTI were artificially imposed by the Hittite administration when ratifying the new geopolitical entities that they denote.
28 If this is so, when did this ratification occur? The self-evident observation that the modifiers "upper" and "lower" presuppose one another suggests that the constitution of the Lower and Upper Land provinces occurred in a single event. Huwassana in Hittite texts and points out that divine names the most rooted and popular in Anatolian local cults, usually written syllabically, could be transposed into heterograms when mentioned in relation to the state cult or invoked as witnesses in international treaties. 29 For this dating of the Maşat corpus and the related debate, see Marizza 2007 , on a prosopographic ground. However, combining archival and recordkeeping studies with dendrochronological data about the find-spots of the tablets, van den Hout (2007) argues for their dating to a limited time-span between 1370 and 1375 BCE that fits better with the traditional association of the Maşat corpus with the late reign of Tuthaliya III. much later retrospective on the reign of Tuthaliya III offered by KBo 6.28, obv. 8-9 (Hattusili III: thirteenth century BCE), the Lower and the Upper Land were precisely among the regions most affected by the attacks. These considerations induce us to set the scene for the constitution of the Lower and Upper Land provinces prior to the reign of Tuthaliya III. If so, the reigns of his predecessors, Tuthaliya I and Arnuwanda I-straddling the fifteenth and fourteenth centuries-appear to be very suitable candidates. In fact, the constitution of new provinces would fit well within the program of reorganization of the Hittite state apparatus that prevailing scholarly interpretations credit to these two kings.
30 This program and the transformations it implied would have been instrumental to the evolution of the Hittite state from a regional power to a hegemonic empire, a process that was going to be completed later with the expansive policies of Suppiluliuma I and Mursili II. What can be inferred about the geopolitical status of the Lower Land region before its organization into a province? Or, from another perspective, did the drawing of a new regional province in South-Central Anatolia entail changes in the administrative territoriality of the Hittite state? During much of the Old Kingdom, the area under Hittite hegemony was limited to a strip stretching between the Pontus and the Mediterranean Sea, across the Kızıl Irmak bend and the Konya plain. In this context, South-Central Anatolia was located at the periphery of the Hittite domain (Figure 1) . In reconsidering the linguistic geography of South and Southwest Anatolia during the Late Bronze Age, Ilya Yakubovich (2010: 239-247) proposes that the Lower Land was the homeland of speakers of the Luwian language-luwili in Hittite-thus rejecting the prevailing hypothesis of their more westerly origin (i. e. Arzawa). On this basis, Yakubovich sets out to demonstrate that the territories that later became part of the Lower Land corresponded to the region of Luwiya during the Old Kingdom. The toponym Luwiya occurs a handful of times, all concentrated in a few passages of the Hittite "Laws" (CTH 291: § §5, 19-21 and 23) preserved in two manuscripts, the older (A) dating to the Old Kingdom and the later (B) to the Empire period. 31 These passages seem to draw a neat distinction between ) but also postulates that another copyist, instead of restoring the correct noun case, replaced Luwiya (A) with Arzawa (B) in order to avoid the nonsensical outcome of having a person from Luwiya being taken away to Luwiya. Implications of this proceeding, therefore, would be that Luwiya and Arzawa were two different lands. 34 Hawkins (33), after analyizing Hoffner's photographs and considering earlier editions of the "Laws", does not even see the supposed error Luwiyaz > Luwiyaš ! lying at the base of the whole discussion.
organization. This would be suggested also by the laws of § §22-23, where Luwiya just indicates what is between the "river", most likely the Marassantiya/Kızıl Irmak that signed the boundary of Hatti, and the enemy land. 35 In sum, even assuming that the Old Kingdom Luwiya and the Empire period Lower Land somehow overlapped, nothing indicates a one to one correspondence. In what follows I will show that, when investigating the territorial organization of the Lower Land during the Old Kingdom, our 'searching image' should not be regional entities, rather a constellation of town-based administrative centers. Documents relating to the Old Kingdom yield very little information about the mechanisms of the state administration, as do Hittite documents in general, but, nonetheless, they depict a territoriality more locally nucleated on several centers rather than articulated in a patchwork of regional provinces (Table 2) . Passages from the single most important historical source about the Hittite Old Kingdom, the "Edict" of the king Telipinu (CTH 19), incidentally relate to a succession of two different arrangements of the local administration. 36 In the earliest arrangement, at work during the very formative period of the Hittite kingdom (mid-17th BCE), the main decentralized administrative structures were town-based districts. To the head of each district was assigned a DUMU.LUGAL, which is either a son of the Hittite Great King or a member of his kin. As shown in Table 2 , evidence of this early household-based control of peripheral town districts seen in the "Edict" is also corroborated by passages of the "Palace Chronicles" (CTH 8).
37
The original intent of the "Edict" of Telipinu was to promulgate a reform with which to introduce firmer rules for the royal succession ( § § 28-34) and restructure the skeleton of the administrative apparatus ( § § 35-40) . With this latter section, Telipinu is credited with having kick-started the second arrangement for the local administration, based on a network of "storehouses" (É NA4 KISIB). The measure was meant to reaffirm and reinforce centralized control on victual revenues and includes, in fact, advice for Telipinu's successors to seal incoming goods with their own seal ( § 40). Despite these changes, the territoriality of the system introduced by Telipinu's reform remained 35 The paragraphs in question concern the rewards for returning runaway slaves, whose values are graded from the easiest to the most difficult basing on where the seizure took place in relation to the vantage point of the writer (Hatti): nearby, the near side of the river, the far side of the river, the land of Luwiya and the enemy land. This would also rule out an absolute identity between Arzawa and Luwiya, since Arzawa is considered among the enemies of The cities of Hupišna, Tuwanuwa, Nenašša, Lānda, Zallara, Parsuhanda -they administered (Hittite:
maniyaḫḫ-) these lands. The large cities were assigned to them.
"Palace Chronicles", KBo ., iii ʹ-ʹ = KBo .,
ʹ-ʹ (CTH ).
Edition: Dardano : -. 
PROVINCIAL SYSTEM
Various sources attesting the Lower Land and the Upper Land as regional provinces.
"The Great Prayer" of Muwatalli II (CTH , ii
-).
Edition: Singer :  and .
The Storm God of Ussa, the Storm God of Parsuhanda, the mountain Huwatnuwanda, the Hulaya river, male gods, female gods, mountains and rivers of the Lower Land.
LÚMEŠ AGRIG attested only as cultic personnel.
See Singer .
nucleated around individual town-based districts, which are thoroughly listed in § § 37-38. So, while evidencing an evolution in administrative procedures, the "Edict" reinstates the existing territorial organization of the Hittite domain, parceled in town-based units. This situation was radically different from that attested during the Empire period, when the Lower and Upper Lands were drawn as proper regional provinces. The transition from a town-based system to a provincial organization is better understood when comparing the geography involved. Some of the seats of local government making up the earliest arrangement depicted in "Edict" § 4 and in the "Palace Chronicles" became constituents of the Lower Land province during the Empire period. This is certainly true for Parsuhanda and Ussa, which are assigned to the Lower Land according to a paragraph of CTH 381, the "Great Prayer" of the king Muwatalli II ( Table 2 ). As to the second arrangement, introduced by Telipinu in his reform, the evidence is even more meaningful. Paragraphs 37 and 38 concur in listing about 100 places, mostly towns. The disposition of the text in these two paragraphs follows a typological classification between two different kinds of storing facilities: "storehouses" ( §37, iii 17: É MEŠ NA4 KIŠIB) and "store- show that multi-centered regional provinces were still not conceived as part of the territoriality of Telipinu's reform. The administrative organization promoted by Telipinu was predicated, indeed, on individual town-based districts meant to function as nodes in the storehouse network fuelling the Hittite state economy. Due to the paucity of relevant sources, it is difficult to follow the evolution of the administrative territoriality from Telipinu to Tuthaliya I and Arnuwanda I, when the regional provinces of the Upper and Lower Land were likely constituted. However, there is nothing in the extant sources to indicate major 38 It is worth noting, however, that the list of § 37 seems to adopt a rough geographical order, with entries organized in an ideal trajectory from northeast to southwest Anatolia. Two lines above the entry of Parsuhanda, we read the place names of Ikkuwaniya (modern Konya?) and Hurniya (Cl. Korna?), that were also likely located in the Lower Land: see Forlanini 1998 : 228-30. Singer (1984 suggests that the region of Hatti be dealt with separately, in the lost § 36 (cfr. III 12: [
Hatti/Hattusa?). If so, this would amplify the impression that, if some kind of regional subdivision actually existed and governed § §36-38 of the "Edict", this was one between Hatti and the undifferentiated "periphery" rather than one between discrete provinces. In conclusion, the extant evidence shows that major transformations occurred in the geopolitical layout of Anatolia between the Old Kingdom and the Empire period. While the Old Kingdom was a segmented landscape of town-based districts, ruled by local representatives of the Hittite king or embedded in a centralized network of administrative structures, extensive regional provinces were constituted at the beginning of the Empire period, between the fifteenth and the early fourteenth century BCE. The Lower Land, occupying much of South-Central Anatolia, was one among such provinces, the other being the Upper Land, in Northeast Anatolia. 40 The evidence discussed also indicates that the provincial constitution, at least in the case of the Lower Land, was determined e pluribus unum, by unifying multiple pre-existing town-based districts in a single regional entity. As a final remark for this paragraph, it is worth observing that the expressions KUR.KUR MEŠ or KUR ḪI.A ("lands, countries"), occasionally featuring the names Lower and Upper Land in textual attestations, may be a vivid signal for the original segmentation of the corresponding regions into several districts.
41
39 For the attestations of the AGRIG as cultic personnel, see Singer 1984: 106-109 . For the land grant Bo 90/671, see Rüster and Wilhelm 2012: no. 46 . 40 I want make clear that, while stressing the novelty of the territorial organization into regional provinces, I am not advocating its exclusiveness. In fact, they are attested in parallel with other forms of direct government, and, outside of the attested provinces, town-based units continued to exist down to the end of the Hittite domain (Beal 1992: 426-45; Siegelová 2001 
The Lower Land and South-Central Anatolia in the fourteenth and thirteenth centuries BCE
The transition from one form of territorial governance to another might be expected to reassemble existing sources of local authority according to different hierarchical dispositions. In particular, some centers ought to grow in importance when becoming foci for the management and distribution of local resources on the wider provincial scale, while other settlements that functioned as local administrative seats within the town-based system could have lost their centrality. The foundation of Level III at Kilise Tepe and, possibly, of the Level A.7 citadel wall at Kınık Höyük, together with the likely abandonment of Porsuk after the destruction of Niveau 5, might be interpreted as material markers of similar transitions. The convergence of these shifts around the late fifteenth century BCE significantly coincides with the period proposed here for the reform of town-based administrative districts into regional provinces. The reshaping of political landscapes in South-Central Anatolia was followed by further transformations during the fourteenth century BCE, also fuelled by new historical developments. As we have seen in the description of the longterm landscape data, during the Late Bronze Age, South-Central Anatolia was a major crossroads in the interregional route system. This centrality likely acquired a new significance by the mid-fourteenth century BCE, that is, when king Suppiluliuma I steadily expanded Hittite supremacy beyond Anatolia, to include the Levant and Upper Mesopotamia. Thanks to this achievement, Hatti, now a geographic term referring to the entire Hittite domain, gained a new position in the Eastern Mediterranean network and established exchange relationships on equal terms with longstanding powers, especially Egypt. However, this condition could continue having fruitful returns thanks to a tighter integration, more so than through just military and political control over Anatolia and the Levant. For instance, the flow of communications with the newly conquered territories in the Levant also had to be enhanced. Even though overland routes likely continued to play a prominent role in this scenario, especially for military purposes, 42 connections by sea probably acquired a new significance at least in relation to trading activities: the Eastern Mediterranean hub of Ugarit, as well as 42 This might be the case, for example, of the Gezbel pass connecting the Kayseri province with Maraş through the Zamantı Su valley. Significantly, the western entrance of this route is marked by Hittite landscape monuments: Fıraktın, representing Hattusili III and his wife Puduhepa (thirteenth century BCE), Taşcı, also linked with Hattusili III, İmamkulu, and Hanyeri (Ehringhaus 2005: 59-80) . On the possible significance of these monuments and the related route for the military communications, see Ullmann 2014: 115-19 .
The Making of Hittite Imperial Landscapes the seashores of Cilicia and the Northern Levant, in fact, were drawn under stable Hittite control, a situation that lasted until the end of the thirteenth century BCE. The Levantine coast could be most easily reached from NorthCentral Anatolia via the Mediterranean Sea after crossing the Taurus along the Cilician Gates and, especially, the Göksu valley (Figure 4 ). Both passages were exclusively accessed through the Konya plain, i. e. through the Hittite Lower Land. This means that as of the mid-fourteenth century BCE this region became the natural trait d'union in an interregional communication network entirely subsumed under Hittite control and having its poles in North-Central Anatolia to the one side and the Levantine coast to the other. As hinted by the abovementioned pattern of diffusion in Anatolia of the Red Lustrous Wheel-made ware (paragraph 3.1), the Göksu area was particularly vital in this system. As anticipated, the port of Ura, in the likely vicinity of modern Silifke, had a crucial role in the commercial relations between Hatti and the Levant. 43 In particular, as evidenced by a series of letters sent to the court of Ugarit during the late Empire period, Ura might play as an intermediary in the flow of grain supplies during times of food shortage. 44 In the thirteenth century the Great King Hattusili III (thirteenth century BCE) issued a number of provisions regulating the relationship between the authorities of Ugarit and the merchants of Ura, who had evidently become a permanent presence at Ugarit. 45 Several merchants of Ura are indeed attested at Ugarit in juridical documents. In one of these texts (RS 17.316) they are called "merchants of My Majesty", i. e. of the Hittite Great King, thus indicating the latter's direct involvement in Ura's commercial relationships. 46 All this evidence indicates that, starting at least with the fifteenth 43 Discussed in detail in Klengel 1974 and 44 Two among such documents, RS 20.212 and RS 26.158 (Ug. V, nos. 33 and 171) were found at Ugarit. They are written in Akkadian and were sent by the Hittite Great King, or one of his emissaries, to the king of Ugarit, but in neither case the names of sender and addressee are preserved. RS 20.212, possibly dating to the reign of Tuthaliya IV (Singer 2006a: 248-49) , reports a request of grain supplies to be gathered in Mukiš (modern Hatay province, Turkey) and sent to Ura that was struck by a famine. RS 26.158, possibly dating to the reign of Suppiluliuma II (Klengel 1974: 170) , reports a similar request but this time with Ura playing as intermediary for Hatti's own needs. The same applies to a third document, the Hittite letter Bo 2810 (Klengel 1974) , found at Hattusa. Also in this case the names of the correspondents are not preserved, but the sender is with all likelihood the Hittite Great King, while the addressee must be a Hittite prince with some governmental authority in a Syrian coastal city (Hoffner 2009: 363 Table 1) . The beginning of the thirteenth century BCE, as is well known, is characterized by one further deep change in South-Central Anatolia: the transfer of the Hittite royal seat from Hattusa, the centuries old capital of the Hittite domain, to Tarhuntassa operated by Muwatalli II. The circumstances of this relocation are only partially illuminated by sources postdating Muwatalli II, and the motivations behind it remain matter of discussion. The standard view takes Muwatalli's move as a tactic to approach the Syrian front in preparation for the final confrontation with Ramses II at Kadesh (ca. 1275 BCE) . With the Hittite Great King and the bulk of his army engaged for a prolonged period in distant lands, a relocation to the south would have also secured the headquarters of the administration against attacks of the Kaska, a loose group of semi-nomadic populations living in the Pontus mountains that represented a permanent threat to Hattusa and its environs (Bryce 2003: 91; and 2005: 231) . Unsatisfied with such interpretations, Itamar Singer has recently proposed a very suggestive and articulated hypothesis (1996a: 191-93; 1998; and 2006b) , explaining the transfer of the capital to Tarhuntassa in the light of a religious reform with which Muwatalli elevated his own personal deity, the Storm-God of Lightening (pihassassi), to a leading role in the Hittite pantheon. This hypothesis finds support in many later texts and, especially, in the "Apology" of Hattusili III (CTH 81: i 75) , where Muwatalli II is said to have left Hattusa by the "command of his god". Incidentally, the "Apology" also mentions the Lower Land in connection with the destination of Muwatalli's transfer, thus providing textual evidence that Tarhuntassa was located in that province.
47 In Singer's interpretation, Muwatalli's reform would have led to a thorough reorganization of the state cult and of the divine hierarchy, according to outlines that Muwatalli II devised in his own "Great Prayer" (CTH 381). Initially, the reorganization and its religious outcomes were disentangled from Tarhuntassa, and indeed this place name does not appear in the "Great 
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Prayer". 48 However, later sources show that Tarhuntassa, whose name derives from that of the Luwian Storm God (Tarhunt), became the main cult centre for the Storm God pihassassi (Haas 2004: 326; Taracha 2010: 98-99) .
Be that as it may, as to the ultimate causes of Muwatalli's transfer, why choose Tarhuntassa, in the Lower Land, and not other places in other regions? If we maintain that Muwatalli II intended with his policy to come closer to the Egyptian front and, consequently, to avert the dangers of a Kaska invasion, moving his headquarters to the Lower Land was not the only solution, not even the best one. Another more suitable destination, for example, could have been the region of Kizzuwatna, in Plain Cilicia, that lay close enough to Syria and was a well-protected niche fenced in by the Taurus and the Amanus. As a matter of fact, Kizzuwatna and its gods also occupied a prominent place in the religious agenda of Muwatalli II, a predilection also testified to by his own commemorative relief carved at Sirkeli, on the Ceyhan river. 49 On the other hand, recognizing that the origins of the cult of the Storm God pihassassi are probably to be traced elsewhere than in the Lower Land (Singer 1996a: 187-89) , Singer also wonders about the reasons for the specific trajectory of Muwatalli's move (1998: 540-41) . Therefore, he suggests almost in passing that these reasons resided in the search for "a more centrally located focal point for his [Muwatalli's] huge kingdom" (2006b: 44). Our discussion of the archaeological landscape of SouthCentral Anatolia and its implications provides firmer ground to Singer's tentative assumption. As shown above, in fact, probably more than the landlocked Hittite heartland in North-Central Anatolia or other regions of the peninsula, SouthCentral Anatolia was part of an interconnected network, marshaling circulation to and fro overland and sea routes. In addition, the father of Muwatalli, Mursili II, had managed to (temporarily) stabilize the troublesome western frontiers of the Hittite domain, intensifying Hittite involvement in this direction as well. In view of these considerations, one should perhaps fit Singer's reconstruction of Muwatalli's religious reform in the frame of a more "pragmatic" scenario. In spite of the advantages offered by South-Central Anatolia in terms of its centrality and interconnectedness with the southern and western peripheries, establishing a new capital therein required restructuring the existing network of political relationships as well as mobilizing a large amount of economic resources. These implications were very likely unwelcome by the elites most
48 But see Singer 1996a: 165-67. 49 Houwink ten Cate and Josephson 1967; Singer 1996a: 161-164, 185-189; Ehringhaus 2005: 95-99 . On these bases, just Sirkeli has been considered in the past as a likely location for Tarhuntassa (Ünal 1974: 217-222 , under the heading "Dattašša"), a position now to be certainly discarded on account of later epigraphic findings (Alp 1995). rooted in Hattusa (lastly, d'Alfonso 2015, with further references). Therefore, setting the relocation of the capital in the framework of a religious agenda might have been key to destabilizing any incidental opposition. In Hittite praxis, divine sanctioning was fundamental to every facet of political and military life and arguably became even more necessary when a new economic network, including systems of cult offerings in association with religious festivals, had to be rearranged around the new capital. While Muwatalli II clearly intended his relocation of the Hittite political core in South-Central Anatolia to be permanent, the following course of events pointed in a different direction. Muwatalli's son and successor, Urhi-Tešup, left Tarhuntassa and-likely pressed by his uncle, Muwatalli's brother Hattusili -restored the capital back in Hattusa. Still, subsequent revolutions within the Hittite ruling family had a much profound impact on the territoriality of SouthCentral Anatolia. Urhi-Tešup, the king to rule legitimately, was deposed by Hattusili (III) after a dramatic civil war. In the intent to secure his reign and to stall the opposition of other possible claimants to kingship, Hattusili III granted Kurunta, another son of Muwatalli II, the seat of Tarhuntassa, which was vacant after the restoration of the capital in Hattusa.
50 Tarhuntassa, thus, became the seat of an appanage kingdom, endowed with large autonomous power while still formally subject to Hattusa through regulations laid down in diplomatic treaties (CTH 106) . 51 Boundary descriptions included in these treaties, cross-checked with other relevant information, safely indicate that this kingdom comprised a large portion of the southern Konya plain, reaching down to the Mediterranean Sea across the central Taurus (Folanini 2017, with literature). Despite having some of its territories assigned to Tarhuntassa, the Lower Land continued to exist as a possession of Hattusa, forming its southern borderland in face of the new appanage kingdom. 52 The de facto division of 50 For an up-to-date discussion of this troublesome transition and the related scholarly debates, see now d'Alfonso 2015, with thorough reference to the previous literature. 51 A collection of these agreements in English translation is provided in Beckman 1999: 103-18 . The most recent translation (in Italian), with short philological comments, is in Devecchi 2015: 160-82. Only the Bronze Tablet is preserved intact and gives the names of both parties, Tuthaliya IV and Kurunta (Otten 1988) . The very poor state of conservation of the other documents, the "Ulmi-Tešup treaty" (KBo 4.10: van den Hout 1995) and ABoT 1.57 (Beckman 1989-90) , in addition to the puzzle imposed by their content in relation to the Bronze Tablet, has generated a tantalizing controversy about their relative dating, as to Hattusili III or Tuthaliya IV, that is still far from being resolved (see literature in Devecchi 2015: 161, nn. 3-4). 52 As evidenced by the Bronze Tablet and the "Ulmi-Tešup treaty", Tarhuntassa incorporated the Hulaya river land, while Ussa is a border town on the side of Hattusa. On the boundaries of Tarhuntassa, see among the others : Otten 1988; Houwink ten Cate 1992; Gurney 1997; Forlanini 1998; Hawkins 1995: 49-53; Dinçol et al. 2000 .
Anatolia into two parts, with Tarhuntassa handed over to a representative of Muwatalli's first line of succession, ultimately undermined the supremacy of Hattusa, inaugurating a phase of latent competition-if not open conflictbetween the two domains. 53 As it might be expected, South-Central Anatolia was the very fulcrum of this tension, and both Hattusa and Tarhuntassa engaged in considerable ideological investments in the area in order to affirm their respective claims. These investments are chiefly manifested in the several monuments dotting the region that, working as a means of power or identity display, represented symbolic locations for conveying claims over contested landscapes (Seeher 2009; Glatz and Plourde 2011) . All Hittite monuments found in the study area date to about the mid-thirteenth century BCE or later, a period that significantly coincides with the turn of events related to Tarhuntassa and its kingdom. 54 When known, monument sponsorships can well inform about the competing power spheres intersecting in South-Central Anatolia. The relief of Hatıp, representing Kurunta in the guise of "Great King", a title usually reserved to the kings ruling in Hattusa, counterbalances the almost contemporary monumental programs that his cousin, Tuthaliya IV, undertook in roughly the same area (Figure 4) . Conversely, Tuthaliya's monumental activity was more intense in the Konya plain than anywhere else, excluding Hattusa/Boğazköy and its environs (Glatz and Plourde 2011: 56, Table 2 ). This proves how South-Central Anatolia was ideologically and politically a determinant to the outcome of power contests within the Hittite domain. As we have seen in paragraph 3.1, Tuthaliya IV was mostly engaged with the northern bend of our study area, between Emirgazi and Ilgın-Akşehir, which likely constituted the actual border between the Lower Land and Tarhuntassa (Dinçol et al. 2000) . There are reasons to think that this bend also represented a crucial route axis toward western Anatolia that rose to strategic prominence precisely in relation to the novel political scenario of the late thirteenth century BCE. As we have seen, a major landmark in this area is the artificial pool erected by Tuthaliya IV at Yalburt, on the hilltops overlooking the Ilgın and Atlantı plains. Recently Harmanşah (2015: 54-82) stressed that, while being a place of ritualized performance embedded in the landscape, the Yalburt pool complex was also charged with political significance as a place of Hittite imperial commemoration. This is best indicated by the lengthy hieroglyphic inscription carved on the pool ashlars that celebrates Tuthaliya's successful campaigns in the Lukka region, corresponding to 53 For an up-to-date review of the debate about the relationships between Hattusa and Tarhuntassa in the second half of the thirteenth century, see Giorgieri and Mora 2010: 143-45. 54 Ehringhaus 2005: 37-48, 50-59, 101-107, and 119-21; Bachmann and Özenir 2004. Classical Lycia (Poetto 1993; Hawkins 1995: 66-85 (Figure 4) . Moreover, the monuments of Yalburt and Emirgazi held additional strategic significance as they were located along the boundary with Tarhuntassa. In this light, the YalburtEmirgazi route axis can be taken as an emblem of the hybrid condition of the Lower Land in the mid-thirteenth century BCE as both a frontier, i. e. an "outward" edge between the Hittite Empire and its western neighbors, and borderland, as the "inner" edge between the domains of Hattusa and Tarhuntassa. The same impression is also conveyed by the Bronze Tablet, especially in the passage concerning the military obligations imposed by Tuthaliya IV to Kurunta of Tarhuntassa(CTH 106.I):
iii 35−36 Hereafter, 100 infantry troops (of Tarhuntassa) shall go in a military campaign of Hattusa, but no one shall seek (lē šanhanzi) from him (i.e. for Kurunta) additional troops from the administration. iii 37−38 Whenever they mobilize his army, let them mobilize 100 of his infantry troops, but no horse is expected on his behalf. but they shall not constitute permanent garrison (ašandulanzi = ma = at lē).
(Bronze Tablet, iii 35-42; Otten 1988: 22-23) It may be noticed that, unusual for a subordination treaty, the Hittite Great King Tuthaliya IV puts more of an emphasis on what aid Kurunta shall not provide to the Hittite army rather than the contrary. On account of the character of the Bronze Tablet, generally quite favorable towards Kurunta, scholars agree that this passage, as others in the same text, concerned concessions granted to the king of Tarhuntassa by reason of his prominent status. 56 However, it is tempting to also see in this passage a symptom of Tuthaliya's masked intent not to fuel 55 See Gander 2010: 87-89 and 123-24 , with thorough reference to previous literature. 56 Mora (2003b) rightly stresses that several clauses in the Tarhuntassa treaties more closely describe relationships among peers rather than subordination ties. As to the favors bestowed to Kurunta, see Imparati and Pecchioli Daddi 1991: 36-37; Bryce 2005: 303 .
The Making of Hittite Imperial Landscapes the military prestige of Tarhuntassa, which could further undermine the supremacy of Hattusa in South-Central Anatolia. This is the viewpoint that could better explain the lines iii 39-42: campaigns on the side of Lower Land are presented here as a special case, notably of the same gravity as a war against another Great King. In both cases, in fact, Kurunta is required to double his normal contingent. But the formulation of the treaty also denounces a particular effort to avoid any further involvement of Tarhuntassa with permanent troops. The prohibitive ašandulanzi lē ("they shall not garrison") addresses no one else than precisely the army of Tarhuntassa: contrary to ll. iii 35-36, there is no apparent intent here to remit the administration of Tarhuntassa from duties but, rather, to restrict its own scope of action, even when Tarhuntassa was siding with Hattusa during a war in the Lower Land. 57 It seems, in conclusion, that the complex political interactions between Hattusa and Tarhuntassa made the Lower Land the fulcrum of a fragile balance between the need for collaboration on security for shared frontiers and latent competition over inner borderlands.
Another document, the letter KUB 19.23 written by a young Tuthaliya IV, emphasizes the crucial role that the Lower Land had in this delicate phase. In fact, after reporting on rebellions in the city of Lalanda, Tuthaliya worries:
Were the land of Lalanda to fall, even the whole of it, it would be for us only a matter of force, but were the Lower Lands (note the plural: KUR ḪI.A ŠAPLITI) to fall, there would be nothing at all for us to do! (KUB 19.23, rev. 19ʹ-20ʹ; Hagenbuchner 1989: 28-29; Hoffner 2009: 347) Stability in South-Central Anatolia was more a priority in the political agenda, insofar as the region also retained its central role in connections with the Eastern Mediterranean. As we have seen, most documents related with Ura and its commercial relations with Ugarit likely date to this period. The exact political affiliation of Ura and the Göksu area during the thirteenth century BCE, as to Hattusa or Tarhuntassa, is still controversial. 58 In all events, communications between Ura and North-Central Anatolia needed the mediation and support of Tarhuntassa (Singer 1996b: 65-66) , which likely controlled the Karaman area down to the western Bolkardağ.
59
57 The same observation may apply to III 36, if we consider "the administration" (É tuppaš) to be that of Tarhuntassa. See on this matter Beal 1992: 53-54, n. 202 and Devecchi 2015: 178, n Matessi (2012 Matessi ( -2013 discusses the possibility, already tentatively raised by Casabonne (2005) , that Ura was a semiautonomous polity subordinated to Hatti. 59 On the boundaries of Tarhuntassa in this direction, see Forlanini 1998: 227 and Dinçol et al. 2000: 13 , with further references therein.
At the turn of the Late Bronze Age, with the Hittite monarchy waning and close to its demise, upheavals and conflicts affected South and Southwest Anatolia, also involving Tarhuntassa itself. This situation drew the direct intervention of the last known ruler of the Hittite Empire, Suppiluliuma II, as we learn from his Südburg hieroglyphic inscription. 60 In likely connection with the same events, an individual named Hartapu was active between the southeastern Konya plain and the modern Aksaray province (Figures 3 and 4) , projecting his own hegemony there through a group of hieroglyphic inscriptions, where he states himself to be "Great King, son of Mursili". 61 The working of these and other centrifugal processes during the Late Bronze Age and the ensuing demise of the Hittite Empire did not determine a complete rupture in South-Central Anatolia. The aforementioned sequence of the defensive walls at Kınık Höyük now provides evidence of a degree of local continuity well after the end of the Bronze Age, while the survival of Late Bronze Age ceramic and iconographic traditions in roughly the same region through the Early Iron Age is also now considered a fact. 62 The Iron
Age (re)emergence of more readily recognizable 'Hittite' political and cultural traits in the Neo-Hittite polities of the eastern fringes of South-Central Anatolia definitely shows that features of local administration and economy probably continued to work in those regions, indicative of the high level of integration that they had attained within the network of Hittite core-periphery interactions.
60 Reference edition: Hawkins 1995. I retain here the historical reconstruction based on the conventional interpretation of the SÜDBURG inscription. However, a novel debate about its authorship (Suppiluliuma I or II?), and the identification of TONITRUSURBS REGIO with Tarhuntassa is now being fuelled by the works of Oreshko (2012) , Klinger (2015) and Payne (2015: 78-84) . Problems of interpretation are especially due to an overwhelming usage of rare or even hapax ideograms. The passage concerning TONITRUS URBS REGIO ( § §12a-17) is taken either as evidence of open warfare between Hattusa and this geographic entity, whatever it is (Hawkins 1995: 61-63; Bryce 2007: 127) or otherwise (Singer 1996b; Melchert 2002) . Be that as it may, recent philological examinations (Yakubovich 2008) induce to reconsider TONITRUS URBS REGIO as but one among numerous lands involved in Suppiluliuma's military operations against third parties. In an unpublished paper presented at the 8th International Congress of Hittitology (Warsaw, 5th September 2011), Petra Goedegenbuure retains that also locales of north and northeast Anatolia were involved in the events narrated in the Südburg inscription. 
Conclusions
This paper proposed an analysis of Hittite imperialism by outlining the dynamics involved in the formation and transformation of political landscapes. Focus has been on geo-political shifts taking place in South-Central Anatolia, a semi-peripheral area of the Hittite domain. I have shown how this region underwent considerable transformations in its territorial assets and assumed a pivotal role on a large supra-regional scale, in a process leading in turn to eventful developments within the Hittite heartland. Although being context specific, the conclusions proposed here have wider implications from a methodological point of view. In fact, a case is made for a productive interchange between archaeology and history that enables the following of processes operating at varying levels of social life and scales of durability. I have shown that at least three phases of historical development inform the making of political landscapes in South-Central Anatolia during the Hittite period. Starting with the emergence of the Hittite state in the initial Late Bronze Age (17th BCE), the first phase culminated in the late fifteenth century BCE with the coagulation of town-based administrative units into a larger regional province: the Lower Land, coupled with the Upper Land in Northeast Anatolia. This process possibly had an impact on settlement histories, which is likely signaled by transitions that occurred at individual sites at around the same time. Moreover, the same process provided new ground for further territorial integration, marshalling the full implementation of long-standing local resources. In particular, thanks to the Hittite expansion in the Eastern Mediterranean and, above all, the annexation of Ugarit and the Levant by Suppiluliuma I, South-Central Anatolia became a pivotal node in an expanded communication network, entirely subsumed within the Hittite sphere of control including sea routes across the Eastern Mediterranean. This is the second phase in the present reconstruction, covering the fourteenth through the mid-thirteenth centuries BCE. This phase might also have had an impact on settlement histories, being possibly associated with the transition between Levels III and II at Kilise Tepe, a site that, in fact, was located along the Göksu valley, one of the main linkages between Central Anatolia and the Mediterranean. Ultimately, the increased centrality of South-Central Anatolia had a tremendous effect on the very inner politics of Hatti, becoming the pole of attraction for the foundation of a new capital, Tarhuntassa. The ensuing events open the third and last phase in our reconstruction, occupying the second half of the thirteenth century BCE. In fact, the constitution of an appanage kingdom in Tarhuntassa, resulting from the internecine struggles between Hattusili III and Urhi-Tešup, marked a deep fracture in the political landscape of South-Central Anatolia that became a contested territory while continuing to be a frontier towards West Anatolia.
The picture of Hittite imperialism emerging from this synthesis reflects multi-causal and multi-directional processes, not predicated on the sole centrifugal hegemonic expansion of the Hittite Empire. I have shown, in fact, that structural changes in the peripheries may propel revolutions within the core sources of power, having, in turn, further side effects in the socio-spatial network of political relations.
